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Abstract
In this essay, I argue that the idea that there is a most fundamental discipline, or level of reality,
is mistaken. My argument is a result of my experiences with the “science wars”, a debate that raged
between scientists and sociologists in the 1990’s over whether science can lay claim to objective truth.
These debates shook my faith in physicalism, i.e. the idea that everything boils down to physics. I outline
a theory of knowledge that I first proposed in my 2015 FQXi essay on which knowledge has the structure
of a scale-free network. In this theory, although some disciplines are in a sense “more fundamental” than
others, we never get to a “most fundamental” discipline. Instead, we get hubs of knowledge that have
equal importance. This structure can explain why many physicists believe that physics is fundamental,
while some sociologists believe that sociology is fundamental.
This updated version of the essay includes and appendix with my responses to the discussion of this
essay on the FQXi website.
1 What is Fundamental?
As a physicist, it is easy to be impressed with the understanding that fundamental physics has gifted us.
Through the ingenuity and hard work of thousands of physicists, we have learned that all matter and energy
in the universe is composed of interacting quantum fields, and we can in principle predict their behavior
to great accuracy using the standard model of particle physics. On the large scale, Einstein’s theory of
General Relativity, together with the standard model of cosmology, give us an accurate picture of how the
universe began, and how it behaves on large scales. Sure, there are a few phenomena that are outside the
scope of current physics, such as what happens in the very early universe or near the singularity of a black
hole, but, on the scales relevant to human life, we have a pretty complete understanding of all the relevant
constituents of matter and fundamental laws. This picture is complete in the sense that it does not seem to
need any concepts from the other sciences, except perhaps mathematics, in order to describe all matter. In
principle, we could use fundamental physics to predict with the greatest possible accuracy what will happen
in any given situation, including those relevant to chemistry and biology, and even in those sciences that deal
with the human mind, such as neuroscience, psychology, and sociology. I say “in principle” because those
calculations would involve an impossibly detailed description of the initial conditions of the system being
studied, as well as infeasible computational power. It would be essentially impossible to identify and model
a biological system directly in terms of its constituent quantum fields. So we can admit that, in practice,
biological explanations of how cells operate are much more useful than descriptions in terms of fundamental
physics. However, the question “what is fundamental?” concerns what is possible in principle rather than
with what is possible in practice.
The view outlined above, that everything boils down to physics, is called physicalism. Although it is an
attractive view for a physicist—I, personally, was drawn to physics because it seemed to be the only way
to truly understand the fundamental nature of reality—I shall be arguing for precisely the opposite view
in this essay. My position is deeply influenced by the “Science Wars”; a battle that raged in the 1990’s
between scientists, philosophers, and sociologists over whether science can lay claim to objective truth. In
many ways, I am a casualty of the science wars, since they were at their peak during my undergraduate
education. Being young enough not to have developed strong opinions about the meaning of science, I have
1
ar
X
iv
:1
81
0.
05
27
2v
1 
 [p
hy
sic
s.h
ist
-p
h]
  1
1 O
ct 
20
18
been influenced by the sociology camp to a greater extent than most scientists. The extreme version of the
sociology side of the argument, which I call sociologism, claims not only that science is not objectively true,
but that sociology is more fundamental than physics. It is quite understandable that a sociologist might find
this view as appealing as physicalism is to a physicist, and a bit surprising that we do not have even more
“isms” where scholars seek to put their own discipline at the top of the tree.
Although I want to incorporate some of the sociological insights into my argument, of course I view
sociologism as just as barmy as physicalism. However, the fact that scholars can seriously argue that
a discipline other than physics should be considered fundamental lends some support to my thesis that
“fundamental” is a mistaken category. If this is so, then we shall need a theory of knowledge that accounts
for the fact that subjects like physics can seem more “fundamental” than others when this is not actually
so. I shall attempt to develop such a theory as well.
This essay is a sequel to my 2015 FQXi essay “Mathematics is Physics”[1], in which I proposed a theory
of knowledge intended to explain why it is not surprising that advanced mathematics is so useful in physics.
The theory of knowledge employed here is the exact same one, but I want to relate it more explicitly to my
thoughts on the science wars.
2 Dispatches from the Science Wars
I would like to begin with the story of my first encounter with the science wars. When I was an undergraduate
studying physics at Manchester, my brother, who studied philosophy, got me interested in philosophy of
science by asking me difficult questions over dinner. Since the well-being of my psyche depended on being
able to defend the position that physics is the most fundamental way of understanding the world, I jumped
at the chance to take a course entitled “The Nature of Scientific Enquiry” when the opportunity came up.
At the very least, I figured, it would help me win dinner table arguments with my brother.
When the time came, I went to see my director of studies, the late Dr. Anthony Phillips (still the best
physics teacher I have ever known) to tell him that I wanted to enrol in the course. His first reaction was,
“Wouldn’t you rather take a course in fluid mechanics?”. After I rejected that option his next response was,
“OK, but don’t believe a word they tell you.” At the time, I thought this rather uncollegial, but I did not
realize that the course was run by the sociology department, and was being taught by a proponent of the
“strong program” in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), a major school on the sociology side of the
science wars. I did not know that we were supposed to be at war, but, in light of that, Dr. Phillips comments
make a lot more sense.
The first half of the course proceeded along the lines of a generic philosophy of science course. We
studied Bacon [2], logical positivism [3], Popper [4], Kuhn [5], and Lakatos [6]. However, unlike a standard
philosophy course, Kuhn was given a ringing endorsement, and then we went off to study SSK.
The strong program of SSK is most closely associated with David Bloor and his collaborators at the
University of Edinburgh [7]. It is intended as a response to earlier approaches to the sociology of science,
which are deemed “weak”. In “weak” studies, sociological factors are only deemed important in understand-
ing why “failed” or “false” theories are sometimes accepted. For example, one might look at how Stalin’s
totalitarian rule allowed Lysenco’s ideas of environmentally acquired inheritance to become the dominant
theory of genetics in the Soviet Union in the 1930’s and 40’s. In modern times, one might look at why the
anti-vaccine movement or the idea that human activity is not causing climate change are being increasingly
accepted in large segments of the US population.
In contrast to this, the strong program states that sociological factors are equally important in under-
standing how successful scientific theories, which are usually deemed “true”, gain acceptance. If a theory is
accepted science, it is very easy to fall back on the argument that the reason it became accepted is simply
that it is “true”. Proponents of the strong program reject this asymmetry of explanation, and want to study
the sociological reasons why science progresses the way it does period, without regard to whether a or not a
theory is “true”. In order to do this they adopt, as a methodological principle, a ban on using the “truth”
or “correctness” of a theory an an explanation for its acceptance.
Although this ban is supposed to be merely methodological—a corrective for decades of studies which
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ignored sociological factors other than in cases of “error”—studies in the strong program tend to show strong
sociological influences in every case they look at. Unless you are being deliberately contrarian, it is very hard
not to infer that, if you can actually find sociological reasons why theories are accepted in every case, then
scientific theories must be social constructs, with no claim to be the ultimate arbiters of objective truth.
Although defenders of the strong program like to emphasize that the ban is meant to be methodological,
and they are simply “hands-off” on the question of ultimate truth, it is pretty bizarre to adhere to a
methodology and, at the same time, not contemplate the most obvious reason why that methodology might
work well. This leads to cultural relativism about scientific truth and, despite protests to the contrary, the
language of cultural relativism does seep through the rhetoric of the strong program. Nonetheless, I define
“sociologism” as the position that scientific theories are merely social constructs, in contrast to the strong
program itself, which insists on only adopting this as a methodology. Sociologism implies that sociology
is the most fundamental science, since it means that understanding the content of any scientific theory is
equivalent to understanding the social factors that led to its acceptance.
To see how easily SSK devolves into sociologism, I want to relate an experience from the Nature of
Scientific Enquiry course. In one of our assignments, we were asked the question, “If sociological factors
always play a role in determining which scientific theories are accepted, does science still tell us anything
about the real world?” In the seminar discussion of this, the graduate TA proposed the answer, “Yes, because
sociology is a science, so the study of sociological factors is still a study of the real world.” This is sociologism
writ large. Not only do proponents of sociologism want to take physicists down a peg or two, but they also
want to view their own subject as more fundamental than the sciences they are studying. Everything hangs
off sociology, as it were.
It is easy to ridicule sociologism. After all, advocates of this view still get on airplanes to fly to conferences.
If you really believe that science is just a social construct, then you have no good reason for believing the
airplane will not simply fall out of the sky. I, for one, would not take the fact that flying airplanes is a
tradition of my culture as a convincing argument to get on board. So, proponents of this view seem to act
like they believe at least some aspects of science are objectively true, while simultaneously propounding the
opposite.
In the throes of intellectual enquiry, it is common to adopt overly extreme views, which later have to be
walked back. This happens all the time on the speculative end of theoretical physics, e.g. the claim that
the universe is literally a quantum computer [8], or that all entangled systems are literally wormholes [9], or
that the universe is made of mathematics [10]. So let’s not hoist all of sociology on the petard of their most
extreme proponents, and instead look at the evidence on which their claims are based.
Most studies in the mould of the strong program proceed along the following lines. We first consider
the modes of enquiry that are claimed to be the hallmarks of the scientific method, including such things as
induction, falsifiability, the role of crucial experiments, skepticism of hypotheses that are not strongly sup-
ported by evidence, rational choice between programs of research, etc. Whichever of these (often conflicting)
accounts of scientific enquiry you subscribe to, the sociologists find that they are violated in almost every
case they look at, and identify sociological factors that played a role in theory choice instead.
There is not space to delve into specific examples here, so I will just mention Collins and Pinch’s study
of the role of the Michaelson-Morely experiment in the acceptance of Einstein’s relativity [11], since that is
of relevance to fundamental physics. In the usual story told to students, the Michaelson-Morely experiment
is a crucial experiment that led physicists to reject the luminiferous ether, i.e. the idea that light waves
must propagate in some medium in the same way that you cannot have water waves without there being
some water to do the waving. The ether was replaced by Einstein’s theory, which eliminates it. Collins
and Pinch show that Michaelson-Morely experiments never produced conclusive evidence against the ether,
despite attempts spanning several years under different experimental conditions.
Now, one might argue that the weight of experimental evidence for relativity that has been acquired since
then is justification for its acceptance today, but still it was accepted long before any of this was acquired.
One might also argue that Einstein’s theoretical explanation of the symmetry of Maxwell’s equations is the
real reason why relativity was accepted, but this was not universally regarded as compelling at the time.
Indeed, the controversy over this is the reason why Einstein won the Nobel prize for his explanation of the
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photoelectric effect rather than for relativity. While it is a stretch to conclude from this that relativity is just
a social construct, the process of its acceptance was rather less rational than one might otherwise believe.
At the very least, the story we tell about how relativity became accepted, which is part of the pedagogy of
relativity, is largely a social construct.
However, the problem with case studies like these is that philosophical theories of science are not supposed
to have the same status as mathematical theories. In the latter, if you find one counter-example to a theorem
then the theorem is false1. Instead, philosophical theories of science propose norms, which we should strive
to adhere to if we want to create reliable scientific knowledge. These norms include skepticism of hypotheses
that have no evidential support, designing experiments that remove as much bias as possible, etc. Nobody
is claiming that these norms are strictly adhered to 100% of the time, and that sociological factors play
absolutely no role. Instead, the claim is that by attempting to adhere to these norms, the community as a
whole, over long periods of time, will develop knowledge that is more reflective of the objective world than
otherwise.
To put it another way, the “scientific method” cannot really be characterized in a precise way that is
applicable to all cases. For any methodological principle that you might propose, one can find cases where it
is not really applicable. But that does not mean that, upon looking at the particulars of a specific theory, one
cannot decide whether the evidence supports it. We may use different methods and standards of evidence
in fundamental physics, climate science, and psychology, but these all bear a family resemblance, and an
expert in one of those fields can use the available evidence to decide how likely a given claim is to be true.
The fact that we cannot give a discipline-invariant definition of the scientific method does not seem to have
gotten in the way of the progress of any scientific discipline in particular.
Nonetheless, the studies of the strong program do show that social factors have played a larger role
in the construction of “true” theories than you might otherwise have thought, so the idea that we should
only pay attention to sociology in cases of “error” is suspect. Generally, all scientific discourse takes place
within a language, and is conducted by entities that are situated within a society, with all the baggage
that that entails, so social values are implicitly used in the construction of science whether we like it or
not. Although physics makes heavy use of mathematics, so is arguably less influenced by the particulars of
common language than other sciences, few physicists believe that the content of physics is entirely contained
in its mathematical equations. We need discourse to understand what our theories mean, how they are
connected to observations, and even what questions are sensible to ask of the them. Hence, the idea that
physical theories may not be completely objective, and that sociological factors may play a role in their very
construction, should at least be an option on the table, regardless of how small or large you think that role
is.
One example where sociological factors have had a strong influence on physics is the dominance of
the Copenhagen interpretation in the foundations of quantum mechanics. To modern eyes, it looks like
the founders of quantum mechanics jumped to conclusions about the nature of (un)reality based on scant
evidence. While much evidence that can be construed as supporting this kind of view has been acquired
in the meantime, the Copenhagen view was accepted by the majority of physicists for decades without
many physicists actually feeling the need acquire this evidence. Although there is more tolerance for diverse
views on the interpretation of quantum mechanics today, Copenhagen has had a lasting influence on what
physicists think a physical theory should look like, which may be cutting off fruitful research directions.
On the other hand, we do not want to endorse sociologism, in which we cannot explain why airplanes do
not fall out of the sky, why children should be vaccinated, and why we should take action on climate change.
The success of our fundamental physical theories surely means something for the objective physical world.
Therefore, we should not replace the claim that physics is fundamental with the claim that sociology is
fundamental instead. What we need is a theory of knowledge that can account for why we should trust that
airplanes will not just fall out of the sky, but also allows external factors to influence physics in a controlled
way. If it can also explain why smart people can be led to believe that physics is fundamental, and other
smart people that sociology is fundamental, then so much the better.
1Of course, we always have the option of changing the definitions to make the theorem true, if doing so leads to a more
useful theory, and this often happens in mathematics [12].
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3 A theory of knowledge
To begin, I want to recall my own answer to the question of whether science tells us anything about the real
world, that I gave in my undergraduate assignment. It already contains the seeds of the more sophisticated
account I want to develop here.
Clearly, I reasoned, it is impossible that scientific theories have nothing to do with the observed empirical
world. If a theory implied that airplanes must necessarily always fall out of the sky, then we would rightly
reject such a theory as incorrect. At any given time, there is a large space of possible theories that are not
in bald conflict with the available empirical evidence. When new evidence is acquired, the size of that space
is reduced. It is still very large, so sociological factors can play a strong role in determining which of the
theories in that space is “true”, but the chosen theory still tells us something about the objective physical
world because we cannot choose choose just any theory we like. There is a constrained surface of theories
that are compatible with the evidence, and that constraint is reflective of reality.
Whilst I think this is a reasonable response to the assignment question, it is far from giving an accurate
account of the nature of knowledge. This is because the set of theories that are compatible with the evidence
is still truly vast, and contains many things that we would not want to call science. For example, the theory
that is identical to current physics, but also posits that there are green aliens hiding on the dark side of the
moon that are completely undetectable because they do not interact in any way with ordinary matter, is
compatible with current evidence, but we would not want to call it scientific. In the philosophical literature,
this problem is known as the underdetermination of theory by evidence. This problem does not seem to arise
all that much in practice, so there are clearly other constraints that determine what counts as knowledge.
Some of these may come from social factors, and some from more objective norms. To resolve this, we have
to look at the actual structure of human knowledge.
Note that here I am diverging from what epistemologists (philosophers who study the nature of knowledge)
usually mean by a theory of knowledge. An epistemologist would usually define knowledge as something
like “justified, true belief” and study the way in which knowledge is discovered as a separate question from
whether it is justified. For example, if I have an intuition in the shower that leads to a new theory of
physics then I do not need to think about why I came up with that intuition (the context of discovery)
to understand whether we should believe the theory (the context of justification). I reject the distinction
between the contexts of discovery and justification because I think that key aspects of the process by which
we uncover new knowledge determine its relationship to other knowledge and to the empirical world.
To understand the structure of knowledge, consider a network of nodes connected by links (see fig. 1).
The nodes are supposed to represent items of knowledge. These can include basic facts of experience, e.g.
“that car looks red”, more abstract physical facts, e.g. “the charge of the electron is 1.602×10−19 C.”, or even
whole theories, e.g. “Electrodynamics”. Clearly, the more abstract nodes can be broken down into smaller
constituents, e.g. we can break electrodynamics down into its individual equations and explanations, so we
can look at the network at a higher or lower degree of abstraction or coarse-graining. The links represent a
connection between items of knowledge. I do not want to be too specific about the nature of this connection.
It could mean, “can be derived from”, “is a special case of”, or even “there is a strong analogy between”.
Depending on the nature of the allowed connections, we would obtain slightly different networks, but that is
fine so long as we allow sufficient types of connections to capture what we want to think of as the structure
of knowledge.
There is evidence that the knowledge network, so constructed, would have the structure of a scale free
network [13]. Without getting into the formal definition of such networks, the distribution of nodes and
links in such networks has two important properties. Firstly, there are some nodes, called hubs, which have
significantly more connections to other nodes than a typical node. Secondly, the shortest path you can take
between two nodes by following links is much shorter than you would think, given the total number of nodes.
This second phenomenon is called “six degrees of separation” after the idea that any two people on Earth
can be connected by friend-of-a-friend relationships in about six steps, despite the fact that there are billions
of people on Earth.
Now, obviously, I do not literally have the knowledge network to hand, but there are real world networks
that ought to approximate its structure. We could, for example, look at the structure of the world wide web,
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Figure 1: Example of a network of nodes and links.
where web pages are the nodes and hyperlinks are the links, or do the same thing for Wikipedia articles.
We could take the nodes to be scientific papers and draw a link when one paper cites another. All of
these examples have been found to approximate the structure of a scale-free network [13]. Now, obviously,
such networks include things that we would not ordinarily want to call “knowledge”, such as the name
of Kanye West and Kim Kardashian’s latest baby, or authors citing their own papers for no other reason
than to increase their citation count. However, whenever a society of intelligent agents form a network of
connections organically by a large number of individual actions, they seem to do so in a scale-free way. Since
the knowledge network is generated in this way, it seems likely that it would be scale-free too.
In my 2015 FQXi essay, I gave a mechanism for the generation of knowledge by abstraction from analogies
that could plausibly lead to a scale-free knowledge network. This process starts with nodes that represent
the blooming, buzzing confusion of raw experience, which will end up being the nodes at the edges of the
networks. We then draw analogies between nodes that are similar and, at some point, develop a higher
level abstraction to capture the commonalities of those nodes. The links between every analogous node are
then replaced with links to the higher level node, which reduces the number of links and complexity of the
network. This process continues at higher and higher levels of abstraction, drawing analogies between higher
level nodes and then replacing those by further abstractions. For further details, I refer to my 2015 essay.
Here, I want to make a few points about the structure of the network so generated. Firstly, the “real
world” imposes itself on the network by the edge nodes that represent raw experience. The commonalities
of those nodes impose the set of analogies it is possible to draw, and hence the abstractions it is meaningful
to define. In this way, the empirical world imposes itself on even very high level abstractions, such as the
fundamental physical theories, so those theories do reflect the structure of the physical world. However, there
are also many ways in which societal contingencies affect the structure of the network, e.g. the interests of
the participating agents affect the order in which analogies and abstractions are drawn, which can affect the
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global structure of the network. So we can have a strong role for both the physical world and sociological
factors in determining what we regard as the “true” structure of knowledge.
It is important to note that any large set of interacting agents attempting to make sense of the world
could use this process to generate a scale-free knowledge network. Intelligent aliens or artificial intelligences
would work just as well as humans. What is important is that there are independent entities interacting
via social connections. The structure of the network is partly reflective of the structure of the world, and
partly reflective of the fact that a social network of agents is generating the knowledge. I do not really think
that it makes sense to speak of “knowledge” outside this context. For me, knowledge is necessarily a shared
understanding.
At this point, one might ask why a scale-free network is a good way of organizing knowledge, i.e. why
would nature endow us with the capability to organize knowledge in this way? Any given agent can only
learn a small part of the knowledge network. The hub nodes encode a lot of information at a high level
of abstraction, such that it is possible to get to any other node in a relatively short number of steps. Our
fundamental theories of physics, as well as general theories of sociology, are examples of such hub nodes. In
our undergraduate studies, we tend to learn a lot about a single hub node, and work outwards from that
as we increase our specialization. The existence of hubs ensures that the six degrees of separation property
holds, so that it is possible to get from any two specialized disciplines to a common ground of knowledge in
a relatively short number of steps. If, for example, we encounter a problem that requires both a physicist
and a biologist to solve, they can work back to a hub that both of them understand and use that as their
starting point. This enables efficient collaboration between disciplines. In general, scale-free networks are a
very efficient way of encoding information.
The scale-free structure also explains why smart physicists can think that physics is fundamental, while
similarly smart sociologists can think sociology is fundamental. If you only learn a limited number of nodes
hanging off a single hub nodes, then the structure of your knowledge is hierarchical, with everything seeming
to hang off the hub. If you are a physicist, with fundamental physics as your hub, you will see physics as
fundamental to everything, whereas if you have a sociological hub you will see sociology everywhere. The
reality is that there are several hubs, all with equal importance, that abstract different aspects of human
experience. Both physicalism and sociologism assume a hierarchical structure of knowledge, with a different
discipline at the top. If, in fact, the structure of knowledge is not a hierarchy, then the question of which
discipline is the most fundamental simply evaporates. Now, of course, hub nodes are more important than
other nodes because they encode a larger portion of human knowledge, so it does make sense to think of
them as more fundamental than the other nodes, but there is no sense in which everything boils down to a
single most fundamental node.
4 Conclusion
In conclusion, if human knowledge has the structure of a scale-free network, which is as much a feature of the
fact that it is generated by a society of interacting agents as it is reflective of the physical world, then there
is no sense in talking about a most fundamental area of knowledge. The question, “what is fundamental?”
simply evaporates.
Although I have argued that physical knowledge is reflective of physical reality, we still have the question
of how objective it is. Does the physics knowledge network necessarily have to look similar to our current
theories of physics, or could there be a very dissimilar looking network that is equally efficient, formed on the
basis of the same evidence? Even if we think of the process of acquiring knowledge as looking for the most
efficient scale-free encoding, there could be local minima in the space of all possible networks, which would
be difficult for a process based on locally adding nodes and replacing links to get out of. If two societies
can end up with very different networks based on the same process, then this lends weight to the argument
that social construction is the dominant influence of scientific theories. However, if the physics networks
generated by this process all tend to look the same up to minor differences, then they are more reflective of
the world than of society.
I view this as an empirical question. If we ever encounter an advanced alien civilization that has developed
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in isolation from us, will its physics network look similar to ours or not? I think it is likely that the answer is
yes, but that is not something I can prove. Barring contact with aliens, we could answer the same question
by placing a network of sufficiently advanced artificial intelligences on a knowledge gathering quest. This is
obviously not a question we can answer right now, but maybe one day we will.
A Responses to Online Discussion
Since it was posted on the FQXi wesbite, this essay has generated an interesting online discussion. Unfor-
tunately, I was not able to participate actively in the discussion at the time, so I respond to some of the
more interesting comments here. There is not space to address every comment, so interested readers are
encouraged to read the full discussion online [14].
Jochen Szangolies argues that the reliable convergence of ideas in physics should be taken as evidence
that physics is objective and fundamental, citing the historical example of the convergence of measurements
of the charge to mass ratio of the electron. However, an advocate of sociologism could equally argue that
sociological factors are responsible for the convergence. There would be sociological pressure to come up with
a unique theory. Discussions of which methods of approximation are appropriate, which systematic errors to
take into account, which methods of measurement are most accurate, and which methods of data analysis to
use, all occur within the scientific community. These are primarily responsible for convergence, and could be
affected by sociological factors. Of course, I do not personally believe that sociological factors are primary
in this process, but convergence of ideas in physics is not the knockdown argument against sociologism that
it might appear to be.
Szangolies also argues that there is some ambiguity over what constitutes a “node” and what constitutes
an “edge” in the knowledge network. He cites the example that if “Socrates is a man” and “Socrates is
mortal” are nodes, then the derivation of the latter from the former is connected by the edge “All men are
mortal”, which could also be construed as an item of knowledge, and hence a node. Note that we could look
at this example differently, viewing all three items as nodes, and the rules of categorical syllogism as the
connecting edge, but then perhaps these rules should themselves be a knowledge node.
I was deliberately vague about what should constitute a node and what should constitute an edge in
the essay, precisely because of this sort of ambiguity. The network can be constructed at various levels
of coarse-graining, depending on what we want to regard as the units of knowledge, e.g. scientific papers,
entire theories, basic facts, etc. However, scale-free networks are self-similar, which means that the coarse-
graining of such a network would also be scale-free, so to a large degree it should not matter exactly how
we construct it. It is also important to realize that the knowledge network is only a model for the structure
of knowledge, that I hope caputes important features of that structure, but cannot be expected to capture
all subtleties. In this sense, it is like a model in physics, where carefully chosen approximations are made in
order to yield a useful explanatory theory because working directly with the fundamental equations would
be too complicated. I am open to the idea that a more general discrete combinatorial structure might better
represent the structure of knowledge, e.g. a hypergraph in which more than two nodes can be linked by a
hyperedge. The only important thing is that we can define a notion of scale-free for that structure and that
a network can be used to approximate it. The network structure of the scientific citation network, the world
wide web, and Wikipedia are meant to serve as evidence that knowledge can be approximately represented
this way, but I freely admit that there are subtleties in the structure of knowledge that are not fully captured
by these models.
Szangolies also points out that my knowledge network is epistemic, and does not deal with the ontic
structure of the world, i.e. what is really out there. I acknowledge that this criticism is appropriate from a
scientific realist point of view, but I adhere much more closely to a pragmatist theory of truth, in which what
is true rougly corresponds to what is “useful”. This means I view my epistemic account of knowledge as more
fundamental than any ontic account, and am skeptical about the meaning of the latter. I am committed to
a naturalist metaphysics, in the sense that I think we must look at how the things we call knowledge are
actually acquired, rather than positing an a priori structure that they must fit into.
John C. Hodges points out that human societies have often adopted similar social structures, and that
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Darwinian natural selection may be responsible for this. A scale-free network is an efficient way of encoding
knowledge, and I agree that once evolution has produced an intelligent social species, there would be Dar-
winian pressure to structure society in this way. So I expect alien species to structure their knowledge in a
scale-free network, but this still leaves open the question of whether there is more than one local minimum
for the structure of a knowledge network representing our universe.
Ken Wharton argues that the structure of a knowledge network can still be used to assert that physics
is fundamental, in the sense that, as a hub node, it is more fundamental than non-hub nodes. Indeed,
I recognize that the question of “more fundamental” makes sense. What I reject is the notion of “most
fundamental” and the idea, common among physicists, that physics has the special status of being more
fundamental than anything else.
Cristinel Stoica posits the idea that, since the world is fundamentally quantum mechanical, the knowledge
network should be viewed as emergent from a unitarily evolving quantum state of the universe. Since I am
not a straightforward realist about our scientific theories, I strongly reject this idea. The structure of the
knowledge network determines in part the structure of our scientific theories, so I would say that quantum
states are emergent from the network rather than the other way round.
Alyssa Ney points out the similarity between my view of knowledge and that posted by Quine in his
essay, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” [15]. Indeed, Quine is a major influence on my thinking, and I thank
Ney for giving me a reason to reread this essay. Quine writes:
The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography
and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is
a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges. Or, to change the figure,
total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience. — W. V. Quine
[15].
This is quite similar to my view of the importance of realizing that knowledge is constructed by societies
and the role of experience at the edges of our knowledge network.
Ney also questions whether physicalism is in conflict with the strong program in the sociology of science.
She argues that even if we have sociological explanations for the uptake of physical theories over time, this
does not rule out the idea that there is also a more fundamental physical explanation for why they are true.
While this is true of the formal definition of the strong program, in which the use of the truth of a
scientific theory as an explanation for its acceptance is rejected as a methodological principle, I believe that
most advocates of this program are (at least covertly) social constructivists. Indeed, if you find sociological
reasons for the uptake of physical theories everywhere you look then it becomes difficult to believe that any
other explanation for their success is needed, and a descent into sociologism is likely, if not inevitable. Even
rejecting sociologism, from my point of view, which is more pragmatist rather than realist, I find it difficult
to understand what a “physical explanation” would actually mean in this context. Once I have explained
why the theory is a useful addition to the knowledge network, in the sense of enabling an efficient encoding
of experience in a scale-free way, I do not see what else is left to explain. I acknowledge that this account
is not complete according to scientific realism, but debating the relative merits or realism and pragmatism
will have to wait for a future essay contest.
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